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Viewed from afar, psychology appears to be adrift in trou-
bled seas. Although world-weary cynics might say “it’s 
always something,” the current state of affairs in psycho-
logical science is anything but ordinary. One dominant 
feature of this seascape is the “replicability crisis,” which 
has raised disturbing questions about the reproducibility 
of the field’s foundational science. A number of thought-
ful analyses (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015) have 
provided powerful evidence that something is truly amiss 
and point fingers of culpability in numerous directions, 
including researchers (for carelessness, scientific myopia, 
filling file drawers with null findings, and overvaluing p 
levels); the profession (for unrelenting publication pres-
sures in hiring and promotion); and journals (for biases 
against publishing null results and direct replications, and, 
in some cases, for preferring sizzle over substance). At a 
more macro level, we are in a period of declining federal 
funding for the most basic of behavioral science research. 
This has caused many of our most gifted psychological 
scientists to abandon the research problems they care 
about most deeply and, in some cases, to leave research 
completely. In areas of psychological science where fund-
ing has been preserved, there are growing discrepancies 
between funding “haves” and “have nots,” with available 
funds being increasingly funneled into the coffers of more 
senior investigators (Daniels, 2015). This has created a 
difficult and often demoralizing situation for younger 
investigators, who are ready to take on important scien-
tific problems with energy and cutting-edge methods but 
aren’t senior enough to draw the funding they need. 
Moreover, with a new administration coming into power 
in the United States, there is uncertainty about the fate of 
science funding. And one final bit of gloom and doom: 
Tenured “hard money” positions in psychology, the safe 
havens that in theory afford scientists protection from the 
vicissitudes of funding and fate and free them up to con-
duct thoughtful and careful science, are becoming an 
increasingly endangered species. Withering economic 
realities confront colleges, universities, and medical cen-
ters, thus forcing them to rely increasingly on nontenured 
faculty. Moreover, all faculty, both tenured and nonten-
ured, are viewed as potential profit centers, thrusting 
them into fund raising and entrepreneurial roles that are 
not always good fits for their abilities. Beneath all of these 
worrisome realities is the very real specter of psychologi-
cal scientists being pushed and pulled toward conducting 
more expedient, strategic, conservative, careerist science 
and away from doing the most challenging, innovative, 
important, and courageous science possible.
The Replication Crisis: An Opportunity 
for Midcourse Correction
The replication crisis has spawned serious self-examination 
and a number of proposals (e.g., Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 
2012) for altering the ways that psychological science is 
conducted both at the macro level (e.g., open science 
initiatives, research registries, new journal policies) and at 
the level of the individual scientist (e.g., recommended 
best practices for data collection, analysis, and disclosure). 
These are clearly positive developments, and we owe a 
debt of gratitude to those who have taken on this difficult 
and, I expect, sometimes thankless task. Of course, with 
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the advantage of hindsight, the replication crisis was pre-
dictable. Early warnings about the importance of effect 
sizes and statistical power (Cohen, 1977), rigorous hypoth-
esis testing (Platt, 1964), and unreported replication fail-
ures (Rosenthal, 1979) began appearing 40–50 years ago. 
In the ensuing decades, these ticking bombs led to a 
number of scattered explosions and even some changes 
in journal publication policies, but nothing that would 
qualify as a true sea change. Fast forward to the present, 
and these issues are being discussed in ways that are more 
vocal, public, widespread, organized, and action-oriented 
than they were in earlier discussions. Hopefully, we will look 
back at this period as a true inflection point—a moment 
when psychological science took a significant turn in the 
right direction.
Replicability: Necessary but Not Sufficient
If we could only clean up the replication problem, then 
all would be well: tempting but, of course, far from true. 
Improving the reproducibility of psychological science is 
clearly important; reproducibility, however, does not 
ensure quality. A study can comply with all of the pro-
scriptions of open science (e.g., preregistered hypotheses, 
sample sizes that ensure appropriate power, methods and 
data publicly available, no cherry picking among vari-
ables and findings) and be supported by direct replication 
without shrinking effect sizes but still be trivial and unim-
portant. Much as reliability limits validity but does not 
ensure it, replicability reassures us that the science was 
done properly and that the findings are likely to be “real,” 
but it does not guarantee that these findings will create 
new insights, add meaningfully to existing bodies of 
knowledge, provide critical tests among competing theo-
ries, generalize to other situations and populations, or 
address human suffering. Replicability is foundational and 
necessary but clearly is not sufficient for taking the full 
measure of psychological science.
Five Suggestions
With the current spate of self-examination and the grow-
ing mandate for change stimulated by the replication cri-
sis, it is a good time to broaden the discussion beyond 
replicability per se to take stock of other opportunities 
for moving psychological science in the right direction. 
In the spirit of this special section, I offer five suggestions 
that might help accomplish this goal.
1. Take sampling more seriously
Psychological science is awash in samples that are con-
structed on the basis of “convenience” rather than being 
constructed to represent populations of interest. Non- 
rep resentative samples create enormous problems for 
external validity by sorely limiting our ability to general-
ize findings to larger populations. In addition, these sam-
ples can contribute to problems with replicability (e.g., 
when original and replication samples are not compara-
ble). Psychological scientists rarely take the level of care 
in sample construction that is expected in other social 
sciences. Rather, a great deal of psychological science is 
done with the most convenient samples of all: under-
graduates fulfilling psychology course requirements and 
online “workers.” Understandably, the geographical limi-
tations of laboratory research makes it impractical to con-
struct representative national samples (although in recent 
years satellite laboratory studies have been grafted on to 
large representative national surveys), but samples can 
be constructed to be representative of local populations. 
Large bodies of research indicate that psychological pro-
cesses are profoundly influenced by factors such as sex, 
ethnicity, age, socioeconomic status, education, and reli-
gion. Thus, it seems critical to make sure that these kinds 
of factors are taken into account when constructing sam-
ples (e.g., Graham, 1992). Careful sample construction 
can be difficult, time consuming, and expensive, and psy-
chologists typically receive little training in the methods 
involved. In an era of widespread interest in psychologi-
cal diversity, it will be increasingly important to know 
exactly who we are studying in our research and increas-
ingly perilous to assume that different samples recruited 
by different laboratories are ipso facto equivalent on the 
basis of the most superficial of similarities (e.g., “college 
students” or “young adults”).
2. Bite the bullet on longitudinal designs
Prediction is the centerpiece of psychological science. A 
primary goal of our research is to anticipate how lives 
will turn out. Although some things happen in an instant, 
many important psychological outcomes (health, well-
being, life satisfaction, relationship satisfaction, compe-
tence, expertise, attitudes, values, psychopathology, etc.) 
develop and change over time. Most of the foundational 
questions in psychological science would benefit greatly 
from longitudinal designs (a point that is made in count-
less discussion sections when data are not available to 
disambiguate key directional and temporal relationships 
among variables). Studies in which predictors and out-
comes are measured at the same point in time may be 
efficient and convenient and may help feed the hungry 
beasts of publication and career pressures. However, 
they ultimately leave us with intriguing findings that beg 
for additional information about directionality (e.g., if 
cancer progression shows a significant negative correla-
tion with positive emotion, is it because positive emotion 
slows the progression of cancer and/or because having 
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cancer that is slowly progressing makes us feel better?). 
In many areas of psychological science, mediational anal-
yses (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986) are considered de 
rigueur for understanding processes and mechanisms. To 
realize the full value of these analyses requires longitudi-
nal designs in which predictors, mediators, and outcomes 
are measured in the appropriate temporal order. Finally, 
we have an embarrassment of methodological riches 
available for analyzing longitudinal data (e.g., Duncan, 
Duncan, Strycker, Li, & Alpert, 1999; Ferrer & Song, 2012; 
McArdle, 1988) with many new computational approaches 
and statistical tools that were not readily available in earlier 
times. Thus, there are enormous opportunities for leveraging 
longitudinal data to address some of the most important 
and enduring questions in psychological science.
3. Embrace clinical phenomena
In many health-related fields (e.g., neurology, psychiatry), 
research scientists receive applied clinical training as a 
matter of course. In psychology, clinical training (i.e., 
learning about the diagnosis and treatment of mental ill-
ness) is generally reserved for students in clinical psychol-
ogy. Moreover, because clinical psychology is usually the 
most competitive area of psychology for graduate admis-
sions, programs often develop policies to protect against 
“Trojan Horse” applicants who apply to other areas of 
psychology with the intention of switching to the clinical 
area later on. This protectionism creates resentment, intel-
lectual silos, and proprietary fiefdoms. Add to this the 
commonly held view that clinical training takes valuable 
time away from students’ research, and the end result is 
that students in other areas of psychology gain little expo-
sure and experience working with clinical problems and 
populations. I consider this state of affairs to be extremely 
unfortunate and short-sighted (Levenson, 2014). Reducing 
the burden of mental illness is one of the primary “deliv-
erables” for all of psychological science (e.g., peruse the 
significance sections of many grant proposals). Although 
the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is often 
characterized as being unsupportive of basic behavioral 
science, two of its major statements of research priori-
ties—“translational research” (National Institute of Mental 
Health, 1999) and the Research Domain Criteria (Cuthbert 
& Insel, 2010)—both envision mental illness as grounded 
in dysfunction in foundational psychological processes 
such as social connection, cognition, personality, emotion, 
motivation, development, and learning. In psychological 
science, the primary expertise and deepest knowledge 
regarding these processes typically resides in areas outside 
of clinical psychology.
In recent years, progress in preventing and curing 
mental illness has lagged far behind similar progress with 
physical illness (Insel & Gogtay, 2014; Levenson, in press). 
Simply stated, we have a number of effective ways to 
reduce the suffering associated with mental illness, but 
preventative interventions and cures have remained elu-
sive. As a result, prevalence rates for mental illness remain 
stubbornly stuck (e.g., Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 
2005). Imagine for a moment if psychological scientists of 
all stripes devoted a least some of their scientific horse-
power to addressing mental health problems. And imag-
ine if graduate students, postdocs, and faculty from all 
areas of psychological science were welcomed when they 
expressed interest in working on clinical issues. Who 
knows how much progress could have been made toward 
reducing the crippling burden of mental illness, which is 
now among the most burdensome of all illnesses world-
wide (Ferrari et al., 2013)?
4. Use stronger research designs
In thinking about improving the quality of future psycho-
logical science, it is worth remembering three “oldies but 
goodies”: (a) scientific progress is based on theories and 
hypotheses that can be disconfirmed (Popper, 1959), (b) 
understanding in science progresses by posing and testing 
alternative hypotheses (Platt, 1964), and (c) testing rival 
scientific theories is not an “either–or” endeavor but rather 
is about establishing the boundary conditions under which 
theories do and do not hold (Jost & McGuire, 2013). One 
clear implication of these principles is that psychological 
science advances most rapidly under research conditions 
that enable our ideas to be proven wrong.
As a clinical psychologist by training, I am struck by 
the need to use stronger research designs in clinical 
research. Studies of psychopathology often compare indi-
viduals with a particular diagnosis with healthy controls, 
which is not optimal for revealing the features that distin-
guish one disorder from another (the latter benefits from 
research designs that include individuals with different 
forms of psychopathology). Treatment studies often com-
pare a complex, multifaceted, manualized treatment with 
a “no-treatment” condition, typically finding that “some-
thing” does better than “nothing” in reducing symptoms 
of dysfunction. But this kind of design cannot tell us what 
parts of the active treatment were necessary or sufficient 
for producing the positive outcomes and which treat-
ments (or parts of treatments) were most effective for 
treating different disorders. Fifty years ago, “dismantling” 
studies (which enable examining the impact of individual 
elements in a complex treatment package) were being 
conducted (Paul & Shannon, 1966), but these kind of 
research designs have unfortunately remained the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Recently, the NIMH weighed in 
on this issue by mandating that treatment studies utilize 
stronger research designs in which there is a designated 
target mechanism, a way of establishing that the target is 
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engaged by the treatment, and a determination of whether 
the target engagement mediates the therapeutic outcome 
(Insel, 2015). Clinical research is extraordinarily demand-
ing and difficult. These challenges notwithstanding, this is 
surely an area of psychological science where using the 
strongest research designs possible is paramount.
5. Use stronger categorical variables
Although contemporary approaches often eschew group 
designs analyzed using ANOVAs in favor of continuous 
variables analyzed using regression, structural equations 
models, and the like, categorical variables still play an 
important role in psychological science. As with so many 
aspects of our science, convenience often works against 
quality. For example, in cultural psychology, nationality or 
self-designated ethnicity is often used as a convenient 
way to form groups; in clinical psychology, diagnoses 
from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) are used. Using these categorical vari-
ables, a cross-cultural study might compare thoughts, feel-
ings, or behaviors among African Americans, Chinese 
Americans, and European Americans, and a clinical study 
might do the same for different diagnostic groups. In both 
cases, problems abound. In the cross-cultural studies, 
individuals who self-identify with a particular ethnicity 
can differ greatly in their exposure to the cultural tradi-
tions of interest. This results in groups that are highly 
heterogeneous. Approaches that address these concerns 
require laborious consideration of cultural exposure and 
practices (e.g., inclusion and exclusion factors that con-
sider birthplace of participants, parents, and grandpar-
ents; ethnic makeup of childhood and current social 
networks; and, as appropriate, cultural factors related to 
language, diet, and religion). Absent this kind of care in 
forming cultural groups, within-group heterogeneity can 
work against finding reliable group differences.
In clinical research, the use of DSM diagnoses continues 
to dominate published research despite a litany of criticism 
for within-diagnosis heterogeneity; arbitrary cut-offs for 
inclusion/exclusion; cross-diagnosis comorbidity of symp-
toms; and lack of utility for predicting etiology, course, or 
response to treatment. Group comparisons based on DSM 
diagnoses are at the core of almost all research on mental 
illness, including studies of psychological and pharmaco-
logical treatments, family and molecular genetics, neural 
circuitry, etiology, developmental course, and disease bio-
markers. Time will tell whether new approaches that 
eschew DSM diagnoses (e.g., NIMH’s Research Domain 
Criteria, which is based on specific symptoms, dimensions 
of functioning, and associated neural circuits; Insel et al., 
2010) prove more productive in increasing knowledge and 
reducing the burden of mental illness.
The little five
These five suggestions represent a subset of issues where 
psychological science could benefit from serious discussion 
about best research practices and standards to help move 
our field in the right direction in the future. The replication 
crisis and its aftermath provide a good model for how these 
discussions can proceed in ways that are largely construc-
tive and inclusive, and that can lead to positive changes in 
the ways that psychological science is conducted.
Advice for Younger Colleagues
A number of years ago, my Berkeley colleagues were 
discussing graduate training and mentoring in a faculty 
meeting. At one point, I asked for a show of hands as to 
whether people considered themselves “self-made” or 
“mentored.” The results were striking; almost all of the 
hands were raised for “self-made.” Given the uncertain-
ties of the future, there is no way to know whether the 
practices, decisions, and strategies that led to success in 
the past will lead to success in the future. In addition, 
there are huge differences among individual scientists in 
their strengths and weaknesses, the contexts they work 
in, the compromises and sacrifices they are willing to 
make, and their standards for success. Thus, my sugges-
tion is not to follow advice from your elders slavishly, but 
rather to always remember the importance of dancing to 
the beat of your own drummer. There is no single alche-
mist’s formula for creating a successful scientist. Ulti-
mately, you will feel better about your life in science if you 
live it on your own terms, follow your own scientific muses, 
have the courage to pursue the questions you really care 
about, and conduct science in the ways you think are most 
excellent. If you are fortunate, you will have superb men-
tors and colleagues along the way who will impart useful 
skills and valuable knowledge. They will also provide 
career advice and share with you their own trials and tribu-
lations and paths to success. I suggest taking the latter with 
a grain of salt. The times are constantly changing, and yes-
terday’s solutions may not work with tomorrow’s problems. 
Most importantly, you cannot allow the advice of others to 
turn you into something that you aren’t.
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